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Community-driven development programs rest on the principle of development aid through active 
community participation. Their demand-driven and bottom-up nature of decision making is expected 
to promote pro-social behaviors. This paper studies the impact of one such program in rural Morocco 
on social capital. We use behavioral experiments in the field to measure social capital among 
households living in communes with and without the policy intervention. Using a regression 
discontinuity framework, we find that community-driven development has a positive but weak impact 
on public goods contribution. This public responsibility increases with treatment intensity as proxied 
by the amount of total project spending. While the program has no effect on altruism, evidence seems 
to suggest that it reduces interpersonal trust. These mixed results signal that social capital responds 
rather slowly, if at all, to a shift from a centralized to a more localized decision-making process. 
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of a community-driven development (henceforth CDD)
program in Morocco on social capital as measured by ﬁeld experiments. CDD programs rely
on the participation of communities to design and carry out development projects. The idea
behind such programs is that communities know their own interests best, so by giving them
the ability to decide on how to allocate development aid, programs may achieve better re-
sults (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). This involvement of communities is in turn expected to aﬀect
social capital. For instance, it has been theorized that CDD lowers the costs associated with
collective action by promoting communities' organizing capacity and strengthening people's
civic responsibility (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012). Furthermore, increased interac-
tion among people in the community is seen as enhancing social networks and promoting
pro-social norms and behaviors (Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2013). In the long term, it is hoped
that gains in social capital might facilitate economic development or help sustain program
impacts. As a result, adding this social dimension or bottom-up nature to development has
become fashionable since the early 2000s. In 2012, the World Bank alone backed roughly 400
CDD projects in 94 countries with $30 billion (Wong, 2012).
In response to the proliferation of CDD programs, a number of studies have analyzed the ef-
fects of such bottom-up development policies on both economic and social capital. Regarding
the former, evidence has been consistent and shown positive results. The result from a par-
alell economic impact evaluation in Morocco suggests that this particular CDD program has
substantially increased household revenue. Regarding social capital, deﬁned as an instanti-
ated informal norm that promotes co-operation between individuals (Fukuyama, 2001), the
evidence has been mixed (see reviews by Wong, 2012 and Mansuri and Rao, 2004).1
Our paper adds to the literature in four ways. First, we contribute to the small yet growing
literature that uses lab experiments in the ﬁeld to measure social capital. Two evaluations in
Liberia (Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2009) and Sudan (Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2013)
used ﬁeld experiments, and one in Sierra Leone (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012, 2011)
used structured community activities to gauge social capital, while the rest relied on survey
information. In particular, we follow the method used by Avdeenko and Gilligan (2013) in
1To the best of our knowledge, eleven impact evaluations of CDD programs have looked at social capital:
ﬁve present mixed results and six report no impacts. There is no or very weak evidence that CDD programs
in Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan have any
impact on trust and social relations. In Armenia, Liberia, and Zambia, CDD was found to bring communities
together, but this impact was only apparent in some groups. There was an increase in the willingness to
contribute to community projects but no impact on trust in the Philippines (Labonne, 2013). A program
in urban Indonesia was shown to have a positive impact on participation in community-initiated activities,
while lowering household contributions to community projects (Pradhan, Rao, and Rosemberg, 2010).
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the impact evaluation of the aforementioned Sudanese CDD program. We ran experiments
in 61 communes with 740 participants in treated and untreated areas, roughly two years
after the completion of the program. In particular, we played the dictator game to capture
altruism, the public goods game to measure the willingness to contribute to the community,
and the investment game to gain insights into levels of trust. Evidence can thus be compared
across countries and projects by keeping the methodology ﬁxed.
Second, in light of the Arab Spring, we provide evidence on the eﬀectiveness of a "grass-roots
democracy" program in the context of a stable and relatively well functioning constitutional
monarchy in Northern Africa. Our evidence can be interpreted as relative to the status quo
of a very centralized system in the process of gradual democratization and decentralization.
Mansuri and Rao (2004) call for more evidence on the superiority of CDD compared to top-
down approaches. In Africa, CDD programs are often transplanted into weak institutions
(see aforementioned evidence from fragile states like Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia), that
is to say, they are compared to little governance in the ﬁrst place. In the Moroccan case,
the CDD program was run and substantially ﬁnanced by the Moroccan government, rather
than by international actors as often happens when states are weak or fragile. Morocco's self-
initiated shift to more democratic principles has been hailed as a recipe for other countries
in transition to follow, especially in terms of achieving a gradual change or reform without
much bloodshed or instability(Tawil, 2013).
Third, and related to the second contribution, we also explore how the CDD program was
implemented in reality. By merging household and commune data with rich adminstrative
records, we can investigate how CDD activities and actual disbursement patterns are aligned
with the development priorities of the citizens and communities. Fourth, we add new evidence
on the causal relationship between economic development, as well as communty participation,
and social capital.2 To this end, we are the ﬁrst to use a regression discontinuity design
to estimate the impact of local development on social capital. A number of studies have
documented evidence of causality in the reverse direction, in that social capital may also
inﬂuence economic prospects.3
In principle, the CDD program may aﬀect social capital through three main channels: First,
the program has increased household revenues, which could inﬂuence pro-social behaviors.
Second, the community-driven approach has possibly led to an increase in the quantity and
quality of interactions among communitiy members. Third, the program may aﬀect people's
2Examples in this literature include Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) on Europe, and Miguel, Gertler, and
Levine (2003) on Indonesia.
3See for instance Narayan and Pritchett (2000); Hjollund, Paldam, and Svendsen (2003); Helliwell and
Putnam (1995); Keefer (2013); Knack and Keefer (1997).
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perception toward authority. When deciding on how to invest the block grants, community
leaders are required to organize extensive consulting sessions with the population, hence
increasing the interaction between people and their leaders. These interactions may enhance
or even undermine people's trust as well as civic responsibility.
In line with the evidence by Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009), we show that CDD
can stimulate the willingness to contribute to the public goods. At the same time, our
evidence also resembles the non-results of Avdeenko and Gilligan (2013) as well as the afore-
mentioned evidence based on surveys in that other impacts on social capital are relatively
small and not consistent. In fact, there is evidence that the program has a dampening eﬀect
on inter-personal trust but no impact on altruism in the dictator game. In addition, although
risk and time preferences could feed into social behaviors of individuals, we detect no change
in the experimental measures of risk and time preferences.4 Using adminstrative and survey
data, we detect similar correlational patterns between CDD spending and these measures
of social capital. We also ﬁnd that the development priorities of citizens and the types of
projects implemented in the CDD program are similar.
One explanation for these mixed results is the diverse nature and responsiveness of social
capital. Indeed, it appears that there is a high willingness to contribute to community goods,
but a low level of trust among rural households in Morocco. Put diﬀerently, individual and
group level measures diverge. Furthermore, as social capital is linked with people's intrinsic
values, it may respond slowly to the participatory activities that the program set up.
This paper is structured as followed. Section 2 provides background information on the CDD
program and social capital in Morocco. Section 3 explains how the data were collected and
summarizes the descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the empirical model used in this
paper. The results and robustness checks are described in section 5. Section 6 discusses our
results in the context of the program and section 7 concludes.
2 Background on the INDH and Social Capital in Mo-
rocco
The CDD program investigated in this paper is one of the four components within Morocco's
National Human Development Initiative (or Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Hu-
main - INDH). The INDH was launched by King Mohamed VI on 18 May, 2005. The objective
4Our ﬁndings indicate that rural households in Morocco are generally quite risk averse and patient.
4
was to improve the country's poor socio-economic record. It was also a response to interna-
tional criticism of the country's overall disappointing performance in human development.
In 2007 Morocco ranked 127th in the human development index. Only four countries scored
worse in the Arab world. The initiative aims to carry out public investments in disadvantaged
areas that are in line with the needs of the local population. The three speciﬁc goals are (1)
"to eradicate social deﬁcits through health and education projects, the provision of electricity
and water, and the creation of cultural, sports and religious infrastructures, especially for
the younger generation; (2) to promote stable income generating activities whilst ﬁnding a
creative solution for the informal sector; and (3) to assist vulnerable persons to enable them
to preserve their dignity and to avoid them sliding into crime and social isolation associated
with vulnerability" (King, 2005). Between 2006 and 2010, the INDH invested 14 billion
Moroccan Dirhams (henceforth MAD), or approximately $1.7 billion, in about 700 local par-
ticipatory plans, ﬁnancing more than 22,000 activities that reached 5.2 million beneﬁciaries
(WB, 2012). It has four components:
1. Rural or CDD component : targets 348 rural communes with poverty rates over 30%
(based on the 2004 poverty map of Morocco) and 55 communes with poverty rates
between 22% (the national average) and 30% and which were nominated by provincial
human development committees;
2. Urban component : targets 250 urban shanty towns and old town centers (medinas)
where social exclusion is high;
3. Vulnerability component : provides support to government agencies or non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that work with the most vulnerable populations;
4. Cross-cutting component: grants Provincial Competitive Fund (PCF) to enable provin-
cial governments to fully participate in the INDH program.
This paper focuses on the ﬁrst (rural) component, which takes on a CDD approach. Within
this component, it looks only at communes whose poverty rates vary around the 30% thresh-
old. However we also investigate the linkage and inherent trade-oﬀs between components
since any rural commune, regardless of its poverty rate, may also be eligible for the vulner-
ability and cross-cutting components. In the rural (or CDD) component, each eligible rural
commune received a block grant to ﬁnance their needed activities. In addition to the funding
from the INDH, communes also contributed around 30% of the total cost of the projects. In
the vulnerability and cross-cutting components, project funding was granted on a competitive
basis. This is diﬀerent from the CDD approach in the rural component where projects were
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identiﬁed and prioritized through a participatory planning process that included all social
groups.
As part of the rural component, a sophisticated administrative infrastructure was set up
with the objective to facilitate participatory planning and implementation, though with close
monitoring by the King. Nationally, the program was coordinated by a central unit at the
Ministry of the Interior. At the provincial level, Provincial Human Development Committees
(CPDH) chaired by governors were set up to validate the proposals of local committees and
facilitate alignment with government programs. The Social Action Divisions (DAS) at the
provincial branch of the Ministry of the Interior provided support and supervision. At the
communal level, Local Human Development Committees (CLDH) were established to select,
monitor and evaluate projects. All local committees were supposed to be chaired by heads
of commune councils. They were composed of 1/3 elected members of the commune council,
1/3 local government oﬃcials, and 1/3 civil society. In practice, this was not always respected
and there was a low representation of women and youth. In each commune, a "facilitation
and social mobilization team" (EAC/Q) was set up, comprising largely of local government
staﬀ and some volunteers from associations and communal personnel, to support the CLDH
in facilitating the involvement of local civil society and citizens into the participatory process.
By the end of 2006, all committees were established and activities were selected and funded
(WB, 2012). Funded activities feature small-scale infrastructure and services (e.g. local
roads, schools, and health clinics), social activities (e.g. sports, culture, youth centers), local
capacity building (e.g. administrative training and facility upgrade), and income generation
(e.g. artisanal cooperatives, market space). Activities were carried out mostly by local
authorities, at the commune or provincial levels, or by associations, and were completed by
the end of 2010.
The CDD approach of the rural component is novel in a country accustomed to top-down
policymaking and high levels of centralization. The decentralization process started in the
early 2000s but has been slow and based on weak democratic institutions, especially at the
local level. Power still tends to reside with regional walis and provincial governors appointed
by the king rather than elected oﬃcials (BTI, 2012). This top-down tradition probably posed
some constraints on the participatory process of the CDD component. Indeed, the fact that
local authorities held 2/3 of the seats in the CLDH means that public oﬃcials maintained
high control of the project selection process. It is also unclear how participation happened
in practice. The 2009 audit report revealed that only 1/3 of the CLDHs held the minimum
number of yearly meetings.5
5INDH (2010): p.24, cited in Morgandi (2010)
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At the same time, the INDH was implemented in the context of relatively low political and
social participation in Morocco. People have little trust in politicians and political par-
ties since there is a tendency for politicians to switch parties and join the governing (often
pro-monarchy) parties. According to the 2006 Arab Barometer survey, 54.4% of Moroccans
reported to have no trust at all in political parties. Socially, very few Moroccans participate
in associations. The same survey showed that membership in voluntary associations was
at 13%, below the Arab average of around 17% (BTI, 2012). According to the World Val-
ues Survey in 2005-2007, fewer than 5% reported being an active member in any voluntary
organization (religious, professional, and political), with the exception of recreational orga-
nizations, in which 9% of Moroccans reported being members. Similarly, a survey conducted
by Bossert, Cakir, Bowser, and Mitchell (2003), which interviewed individuals in 1,198 house-
holds in eight communities that were purposefully selected to be low-income, marginalized
areas, revealed that only 12% indicated that someone in their household was a member of
a group or association. Even among those who participated, most (46%) were in cultural
groups or societies for festivals. The level of contribution of money or time to these organi-
zations was also low. This literature matches with what was found in the household panel
survey conducted in 2008 and 2011 in 194 rural communes for the impact evaluation of the
INDH, in which few people reported participating in any collective activities.
In terms of social capital, there appears to be strong cohesion in some dimensions but weak
solidarity in others. For example, trust is low among Moroccans. According to the 2006 Arab
Barometer survey, 78.5 % agreed that one must be very careful in dealing with people and
this number was 85.3% in the World Values Survey in 2005-2007 (BTI, 2012). The World
Values Survey also indicated that only 13% believed that most people can be trusted, as
compared to 21% world average. 37% trusted completely people they know personally and
this percentage dropped to 1.3% for people whom they met for the ﬁrst time. The small-scale
survey by Bossert, Cakir, Bowser, and Mitchell (2003) conﬁrmed this by showing that 53%
of the respondents said one can never be too prudent when dealing with general people
in the community. Most respondents (92%) felt that they had less than 10 true friends
and that only one or two people could be counted on to help in a short-term ﬁnancial need
(54%). Trust among neighbors was higher, but mainly to take care of children and less about
lending money. Interestingly, people with a higher income tended to have more trust.
On the other hand, people seemed to care about community aﬀairs. According to the same
survey by Bossert, Cakir, Bowser, and Mitchell (2003), among the few cooperatives that
people participated in, most were set up for general community beneﬁt more than personal
income. These organizations also tended to have a democratic selection of leaders (71%) and
collective decisionmaking (53%). A majority of people (70%), when asked hypothetically,
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were also willing to give time and money to community projects and most (81%) judged that
it was probable that the community could ﬁnd collective solutions to problems. Collaboration
was also higher among those with more income and education.
3 Data
Since social capital is a multi-faceted concept, there is no clear consensus regarding its def-
inition. This paper uses the well-known deﬁnition by Putnam (1995), which refers to social
capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that fa-
cilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual beneﬁt." The multi-dimensionality of social
capital also means that its measurement requires an incorporation of diﬀerent aspects, levels
and units of analysis (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).6
This paper uses experimental rather than self-reported, survey-based measures of social capi-
tal. Self-reporting has been criticized to be biased in the CDD context (Wong, 2012; Mansuri
and Rao, 2013). The resulting imprecision may explain the mixed evidence on CDD and so-
cial capital in the ﬁrst place (Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2013). Unlike the membership in clubs,
dimensions of social capital such as trust, altruism, and civic responsibility are abstract con-
cepts. Interviewees may not perceive and express these accurately, in particular in retrospect.
In addition, they may feel obliged or be primed to over-report, say, trust in their community
members. And such over-reporting may be aggravated during surveys aimed to evaluate the
impact of a CDD program itself.
Conversely, experiments mimic actual social interactions among people within a community
to gauge the level of social capital by observing the extent to which individuals are inﬂu-
enced by and behave due to shared norms. The games are played with small amounts of
6Putnam (1995) captured social capital by tracking membership in civil society groups (cultural, religious,
and professional) in America. Taking a more complex approach, Helliwell and Putnam (1995) measured social
capital through a composite of three indicators: (1) civic community (newspaper readership, availability
of sports and cultural associations, turnout in a referendum, and the incidence of preference voting); (2)
institutional performance (a composite measure of the comparative performance of regional governments);
and (3) citizen satisfaction with government services. One of the most comprehensive eﬀorts to measure social
capital is the World Values Survey. The survey interviews people across the world to assess the dynamics of
perceptions and values. Notably, its questions on people's trust of others and their participation in voluntary
associations are often used as proxy for social capital in cross-country research (Inglehart, 1997). Building
on existing literature and questionnaires, Deepa Narayan developed a comprehensive Global Social Capital
Survey. This approach captures an array of indicators that range from group membership to generalized
norms (trust), as well as to volunteerism. The author claimed that these dimensions of social capital are
largely stable and consistent across diﬀerent contexts (Narayan and Cassidy, 2001). Finally, the World Bank
promoted its Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) and the Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire
(SOCAP IQ) to measure social capital at both the household and community levels.
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money in order to incentivize people to behave in line with their preferences. The shared
norms can aﬀect the decision to collaborate and reciprocate even when the monetary return
from deﬂecting or free riding is larger (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995; Ledyard, 1995;
Schechter, 2007). These experiments have been ﬁelded to investigate decision making in
diﬀerent types of programs, ranging from micro-ﬁnance (Karlan, 2005) to conditional cash
transfer (Attanasio, Pellerano, and Reyes, 2009) to CDD (Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2013), as
well as the impact of civil war on social capital (Gilligan, Pasquale, and Sami, 2010). This
method, however, captures social capital at the individual level rather than in its structural,
cultural and institutional role within communities.
We collected behavioral data during focus groups with household heads in 61 communes (31
treated and 30 untreated communes). We selected the communes with poverty rates closest
to the eligibility threshold of 30%, ranging from 28 to 31%. In each commune, we invited
15 household heads from the sample of a household panel survey conducted in 2008 and
2011 for the economic impact evaluation of the INDH. The data collection ran from October
to December 2012, two years after the completion of the program. We were able to reach
740 participants, achieving a show-up rate of 81%. Basic characteristics of the players are
presented in Table 1. On average, there were 12-13 players in each commune, 90% of which
were heads of households. The average age of the players was 53; and 90% of participants
were males and 35% literate.
The experiments consist of ﬁve games to measure risk, time preferences, altruism, trust,
and the willingness to contribute to public goods, respectively. The session procedures, as
well as the public goods, trust, and discount game protocols, were adopted from Gilligan,
Pasquale, and Sami (2010) in Nepal and Avdeenko and Gilligan (2013) in Sudan. Similar
protocols were used by Michael Gilligan (New York University) in Burkina Faso (also in
French). These experiments were originally promoted by Karlan (2005). The trust game is
based on Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and the public goods game follows Barrett
(2005). The risk game is similar to Charness and Gneezy (2010) and builds on earlier work
by Gneezy and Potters (1997).
The games were run in the same sequence and fashion across communes. Before each game,
the rules were ﬁrst explained by a facilitator in a group session. Then participants were
individually called to the game station where the surveyor brieﬂy re-explained the game
and tested the understanding of the participants before they made their choices in private.
Participants were not supposed to discuss their choices with each other before or after the
game. Participants were handed their total payouts only at the end of the entire session.
Each session lasted about three hours. The average total payout was 72 MAD, or roughly
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120% of the daily wage a male would receive for his primary economic activity in these
communes. The results of the games are summarized in Table 1.
In order to measure risk aversion, we gave each participant 10 MAD. They then had the
opportunity to invest a portion of this money in a risky option and to keep the remainder
with certainty. The ﬂip of a coin by the participant decided if the investment was tripled
or lost. For example, if a participant invested 4 MAD, he or she could keep 6 MAD for
sure. In the case of heads, the investment was lost and the participant was left with 6 MAD.
With tails, the 4 MAD were tripled, adding to the safe amount of 6 MAD, and the ﬁnal pay
out was 18 MAD (6 + 3 x 4). A risk neutral or loving individual would invest the entire
10 MAD into the risky option. On average, people invested 3.65 MAD in the risky option,
which suggests that risk aversion was relatively high in rural Morocco.
To measure patience, we asked participants to decide between receiving 10 MAD today or
increasingly larger amounts in three days time (11,12,13,14, and 15 MAD). A person that
always prefers the 10 MAD is coded as impatient, while a person that is willing to wait for
three days to receive 11 MAD rather than 10 MAD today is patient. In the middle ground,
some people switch as the amount increases. Participants were very patient. On average
they were willing to receive 12 MAD in 3 days rather than 10 MAD today.
Altruism was captured through a dictator game that featured three independent scenarios.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the participant was given 5 MAD and could chose to donate any amount
to an anonymous poor family in the same commune. In the second scenario, another 5 MAD
was given, from which the participant could decide the amount to send to an anonymous
poor family in a neighboring commune. In the last scenario, the donation could be made to
development projects in the commune. The average participant gave 2.29 MAD out of the
5 MAD to the poor family in the same commune, 1.8 to the poor family in a neighboring
commune, and 1.59 to the commune. In the main analysis, we sum the three donations into
one indicator for altruism. The average sum is 5.68 MAD.
We used an investment game to measure the level of trust and trustworthiness between two
people in a commune. Participants were randomly and anonymously paired. They were
also randomly assigned to be senders or receivers. Both types were then endowed with
10 MAD and the game was played in two rounds. In the ﬁrst round, the sender could
choose the amount to send. This amount was then tripled and given to the receiver. In
the second round, the receiver decided how much to return to the sender. In this simple
investment game, the amount sent proxies trust in, whereas the amount returned captures
trustworthiness (conditional on the amount received) of people in the commune. Aligned
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with the literature on social capital in Morocco, trust was quite low. On average people sent
3.93 MAD and returned 7.02 MAD.
The ﬁnal activity measures the willingness of people to contribute to public goods in their
commune. People were given the choice to contribute or free ride and the decision was
anonymous. For each person that contributed, every individual in the group received 2
MAD. Those who decided to free ride received 12 MAD on top of the amount they received
from people who contributed. The ﬁnal payout for each individual depends on the number of
people contributing to public goods. For example, if 10 out of 15 people decided to contribute
to the group and the rest decided to free ride, then each of the ﬁve free-riders would receive
32 MAD (10 x 2+12), while contributors received merely 20 MAD (10 x 2). A large majority
of people (67%) contributed. This indicates that the willingness to help and contribute to
the community was high.
Table 1 also presents the diﬀerences in means between people in treated and untreated com-
munes. There does not seem to be any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the experimental
behaviors. For instance, 69% and 65% of participants contributed to the public goods game
in CDD and untreated communes, respectively. The diﬀerence in means is 4% with a p-value
of 25%. The diﬀerences in the level of trust, risk taking, and impatience are tiny. The levels of
altruism and trustworthiness tend to be slightly higher in treated communes with p-values of
10% and 12%, respectively. In terms of the participant characteristics, the sample is balanced
across literacy, gender, and household size. Nevertheless, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the average age that amounts to three years. There are small diﬀerences (but not signiﬁ-
cant) between treated and untreated communes in terms of population size, the number of
poor people, and schooling and road access. It should be noted, however, that these simple
descriptive diﬀerences need to be further investigated to take into account the distance from
the cut-oﬀ and other confounding factors. To this end, we present our identiﬁcation strategy
in the next section.
4 Identiﬁcation strategy
In order to estimate the causal eﬀects of CDD on social capital, we adopt a regression
discontinuity design (henceforth RDD). It is based on the eligibility criterion of the rural
component of the INDH program. Communes could participate in the program if their
poverty rates in 2004 (the forcing variable x) were equal or higher than 30% (the cut-oﬀ c).
In other words, treatment status is 1 if x ≥ c and 0 otherwise.
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To verify compliance with the program eligibility rule, we plot the amount of total project
spending under the rural component, as well as the other two components, for each commune
as a function of poverty rates in Figure 1. The black squares denote spending in the rural
component of the INDH, which was allocated only to communes with poverty rates of 30% and
more.7 The white squares denote spending in the other two components of the program that
all rural communes, regardless of their poverty rates, are eligible for (the vulnerability and
cross-cutting components). The take-up appears to be universal and there is no major cross-
over between the treated and control communes. While there is a sharp jump in the rural
component of the INDH, spending under the remaining components appears unsystematically
scattered around the cut-oﬀ. Note that there are seven communes left of the cut-oﬀ with non-
zero spending under the rural component. However, these small deviations are virtually zero,
so we include these deviating communes. In any case excluding them leads to qualitatively
similar results given the small amount of funding allocated to them. This is therefore a sharp
RDD set-up.
According to Imbens and Lemieux (2007), the sharp RDD estimates the jump in conditional
means of the outcome variable Y in the vicinity of the cut-oﬀ point:
τ = lim
x↓c
E[Y (1)|X = x]− lim
x↑c
E[Y (0)|X = x] (1)
We estimate this diﬀerence non-parametrically using the full sample or a series of smaller win-
dows around the cut-oﬀ. In particular, we select the optimal bandwidth that minimizes the
mean squared error based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The local non-parametric
method also ensures that communes with poverty rates (the identifying value) farther away
from the cut-oﬀ receive less weight. This local approach minimizes the diﬀerences in ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics between the treated and control groups. But it
is diﬃcult to extrapolate the estimates to the overall causal eﬀect of the program on the
entire population of communes. Finally, we also provide parametric RDD estimates based on
polynomials up to the order of ﬁve. We allow the coeﬃcients on the polynomial to vary left
and right of the cut-oﬀ. Concerning inference, we always provide unclustered and clustered
standard errors. The latter account for the correlation of errors within communes (i.e. we
cluster on the forcing variable).8
We conducted some tests on the internal validity of RDD in the INDH context. There is no
7There are also 55 communes with poverty rates between 22 and 30% which beneﬁted from the rural
component but they are not in our sample.
8We estimated the optimal bandwidth and RDD in R using a package by Matthieu Stigler. The package is
a work in progress and available upon request. Alternatively, the RDD package by Drew Dimmery is readily
available on the CRAN servers.
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evidence that communes manipulated their poverty rates. The poverty rates of all Moroccan
communes were established in 2004, which is well before the start of the INDH. As can be
seen in Figure 3, there does not seem to be sorting around the forcing variable based on
the test proposed by McCrary (2008). In fact, the distribution is relatively smooth around
the 30% cut-oﬀ. Another indication of the internal validity of our strategy is the balance
of co-variates around the cut-oﬀ. At the commune level, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in means of predetermined indicators (population size, the number of poor people, the road
indicator, and schooling rate) from the 2004 poverty map (Table 1). We detect no jumps in
these variables using the non-parametric RDD (Table 10). In the same table, we also verify
balance in commune characteristics based on geographical and climate data9 and ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of remoteness (altitude and the length of national roads) or
agricultural conditions (proxied by average temperatures and rainfall from 1950-2000).
At the individual level, we estimate the program's impact on the likelihood of showing up to
the experimental session and predetermined characteristics using the non-parametric RDD
(Table 11). Since the program should not aﬀect the latter, we should see no impact on sex,
age, literacy, and the marital status of participants. However, we cannot rule out that the
CDD component changed the likelihood of a person showing up to the experimental session,
or the kind of household member that showed up. The CDD component could make people
more obliged to participate in community aﬀairs, including our focus groups. Conversely,
the CDD component may have increased employment and therefore people had less time to
attend our focus groups. We detect no systematic impact on the likelihood of a household
showing up and the number of players by communes. Likewise, there is no link with the
player being a household head or male. However, there seem to be diﬀerences in age and
literacy between CDD and non-CDD communes. This can be problematic in that age and
literacy are correlated with experimental behaviors. Therefore, in our estimates, we also
explore the stability of results by controlling for these variables.
5 Results
Before moving to the RDD results, we examine visually our six behavioral variables averaged
at the commune level as a function of the poverty rate in Figure 2. There appear to be jumps
in public goods contribution, altruism, trust, and risk taking, but no clear jumps in terms of
trustworthiness and impatience. It is also important to point out that the slopes associated
with the poverty rates tend to be relatively ﬂat.
9Climate data were taken from WorldClim: http://www.worldclim.org/current.
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In the full-ﬂedged RDD model, we ﬁnd evidence that the CDD component has aﬀected
social capital. However, the impacts are relatively small and vary across diﬀerent types of
social behaviors. The main results from the non-parametric RDD at the optimal bandwidth
(Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012) are presented in Table 2. While CDD seems to have
promoted the willingness to contribute to public goods, it has had a dampening eﬀect on
trust. In other words, social capital at the group level has beneﬁted, whereas inter-personal
social capital has decreased. This matches with the literature on social capital in Morocco
and our survey data, which indicate that trust is low but community responsibility is high.
Conversely, we detect no impact on altruism. One reason may be that altruism is an intrinsic
value of individuals and is unlikely to respond quickly to changes. Likewise, CDD does not
seem to have changed time or risk preferences, which are more fundamental parameters of
individual decision making, as well as intrinsic drivers of social capital. The magnitude of
these eﬀects are qualitatively similar when we aggregate social behaviors at the commune
level in Table 3. However most estimates are no longer statistically signiﬁcant given the
relatively small sample size.
In what follows, we look more closely at the economic and statistical signiﬁcance, as well as
the robustness, of the non-parametric RDD results game by game. In particular, we consider
the inclusion of co-variates, the sensitivity to bandwidth choice, and placebo cut-oﬀs.
5.1 Public goods contribution
We ﬁrst examine the robustness of the impact on public goods contribution in terms of co-
variate inclusion. Table 12 in the robustness appendix presents the non-parametric RDD
results at the optimal bandwidth as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), with
and without controls. Column 1 is the main result without controls. With both clustered
and unclustered standard errors, the local treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant and amounts to
19%. This eﬀect is moderate in size given that the average level of contribution is well above
60% among the control group. The RDD estimate goes in the same direction, but is of larger
magnitude and more precisely estimated than the simple diﬀerence in means between treated
and untreated communes. In column 2, we control for a host of individual and commune
characteristics including the participant's age, sex, literacy, along with the commune means
of these variables, as well as the number of players in the group session, commune population,
number of poor people, a road indicator, and schooling rate. The descriptive statistics of
these variables are summarized in Table 1. In column 3, we include nine region dummies.
Co-variates are added in linearly, reducing residual variance and heterogeneity. In both cases,
the estimates remain relatively stable in size and signiﬁcance.
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To examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the selection of bandwidths, we plot the
local average treatment eﬀect at diﬀerent bandwidths (the top-left panel of Figure 4). The
direction of the estimated eﬀect remains unchanged but the size is sensitive to the choice of
bandwidth. The clustered conﬁdence intervals are overly tight at small bandwidths, because
the number of clusters is small. The opposite is true for the unclustered conﬁdence bands.
They are wider at small bandwidths and tighter as the sample size and number of clusters
increase. We propose to use the more conservative (wider) conﬁdence bands. While the eﬀect
is not detected in the full sample, it is reassuring that the sign is consistent and the impact
is signiﬁcant around the optimal bandwidth choice. The size of the eﬀect decreases and the
estimates become more ineﬃcient with the increase in bandwidth size.
The full bandwidth result is comparable in size and insigniﬁcance to the OLS estimate with
the polynomial of order 1, which also uses the full sample. Table 13 presents OLS and
Logit results introducing various orders of polynomial using the full sample. We allow the
coeﬃcients on the polynomials to be diﬀerent on the left and right sides of the cut-oﬀ. The
coeﬃcient estimates are positive and increasing in size with higher order polynomials but the
eﬀect is only signiﬁcant with the polynomial order of 5. In addition, the size of the eﬀect
appears unreasonably high and the order of 5 is on the extreme end. It is not surprising that
non-parametric and parametric estimates are diﬀerent given their very diﬀerent approaches.
In our context, the non-parametric approach in the optimal window yields more eﬃcient and
stable estimates.
Finally, we re-estimate the main result using placebo cut-oﬀs. We run the non-parametric
RDD separately on the treated and untreated communes and set the placebo cut-oﬀs at
the respective sample medians of the forcing variable, that is, the poverty rate (Table 14).
Columns 1 and 2 correspond to models without controls. We then introduce controls to
models 3 and 4, and region dummies to models 5 and 6. Unlike the estimates at the actual
cut-oﬀ, the placebo estimates are negative. Using clustered standard errors, they are insignif-
icant with no controls or with region dummies, but signiﬁcant with individual and commune
controls included. This can be misleading. To do this in a more systematic and transparent
manner, we also do the same exercise for all possible placebo cut-oﬀs. The left hand panels
of Figure 5 present the results for the unconditional RDD as well as RDD with controls and
region-ﬁxed eﬀects. Conﬁdence bands are unclustered since in some cases the number of
groups is very small. The placebo estimates vary widely and are signiﬁcant in some cases.
One explanation for these placebo patterns is that some sampled windows around the placebo
cut-oﬀs are tight and the RDD may therefore be vulnerable to picking up estimates that are
nothing else but noise. In general, there is no systematic pattern in these placebo regres-
sions. Unlike our main result, the placebo regressions are highly sensitive to the inclusion of
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co-variates, both in magnitude and signiﬁcance. In other words, the apparent heterogeneity
in the outcome variable is likely to explain some of the signiﬁcant placebo tests, but not the
impact at the real cut-oﬀ.
5.2 Trust and trustworthiness
The CDD component led to a small decrease in trust as suggested by the non-parametric
RDD results in Table 15 of the robustness appendix. The reduction in the amount sent in
the trust game amounts to 1.28 MAD in the model with optimal bandwidth and no controls
(column 1). This is 13% of the amount that participants had at their disposal and 1/3 of the
average amount people were willing to send. The coeﬃcient shrinks, but remains signiﬁcant,
once controls and region dummies are introduced in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The eﬀect
is smaller in size and eﬃciency in the full sample but across all bandwidths, the eﬀect remains
signiﬁcant (the top-right panel of Figure 4). Furthermore, the parametric OLS and Poisson
models with higher order polynomials also yield negative and signiﬁcant results, except for
the ﬁrst order polynomial (Table 16). The magnitudes of the impacts, however, diﬀer, with
only the second order polynomial in the OLS model yielding a result of comparable size (1.47
MAD).
Reduced trust is reciprocated with a decrease in trustworthiness. The impact on trustwor-
thiness is negative in the non-parametric with and without controls, except for when we
condition on the amount sent in the non-parametric RDD model (Table 17). This sign re-
versal suggests that CDD aﬀected trustworthiness mainly through the reduction of trust in
the ﬁrst place. Unfortunately, it is hard to estimate such indirect impacts precisely, given
the relatively small sample. The non-parametric estimates are generally insigniﬁcant. How-
ever, as seen in the middle-left panel in Figure 4, the impact is signiﬁcant if using smaller
bandwidths. The results for trustworthiness in the OLS and Poisson models are signiﬁcant
with polynomials of orders higher than one (Table 18).
To check the robustness of these results, we perform some placebo tests similar to those for
the public goods game (Table 14). In the case of trust, the estimates tend to be insigniﬁcant
at the median placebo cut-oﬀ. Only the left placebo in the model with controls and the right
placebo in the model with region dummies are signiﬁcant. Similar patterns emerge in the case
of trustworthiness, with only the right placebo in the unconditional estimate and the right
placebo in the model with region dummies are signiﬁcant. Figure 6 shows the placebo results
along diﬀerent cut-oﬀs left and right of the forcing variable. They are largely insigniﬁcant
and reveal no apparent pattern.
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5.3 Deep values: altruism, and risk and time preferences
We do not ﬁnd an impact on altruism as measured by the sum of donations in the three
dictator games. Similar results hold for the three donations seperately. The results remain
insigniﬁcant across diﬀerent speciﬁcations in the non-parametric and parametric estimates
(Tables 19 and 20). This non-impact is also obtained along diﬀerent bandwidths as indicated
in Figure 4. While the median placebos happen to be signiﬁcant, ﬂipping from negative on
the left to positive on the right (Table 14), the placebos across all possible cut-oﬀs are mostly
insigniﬁcant and vary widely in size and sign (Figure 5).
Similarly, risk and time preferences have not changed in response to the CDD component.
The impacts on risk taking in the lottery activity and patience in the discount game are
small and insigniﬁcant. Non-parametric results are presented in Table 21. We detect some
signiﬁcant but still small impact for the risk activity conﬁned in the range of very small
bandwidths. However, these are obtained neither at the optimal bandwidth nor in the full
sample. The impact on impatience is always insigniﬁcant across bandwidths (Figure 4). The
OLS and parametric RDD results are also generally insigniﬁcant across orders of polynomials
(Table 22). Also the placebos at the median (Table 14) and across diﬀerent cut-oﬀs tend to
be insigniﬁcant (Figure 7).
6 Discussion
Our results, which indicate weak (and mixed) impacts of CDD on social capital, are aligned
with other impact evaluations of CDD programs as described above as well as with the
literature on CDD. There has been criticism that there is no evidence of gains relative to
"standard" top-down alternatives (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). There can be many explanations
for the mixed empirical evidence on the social impacts of CDD. One is that such programs
sound good in theory but turn out to be top-down in practice. In particular, the lack
of information and experience may limit the capacity of people to be involved in complex
decision making. Likewise, bringing about changes in power structures and institutions
takes time. Due to its very nature, the participatory process takes longer than top-down
approaches, even more so if capacity has to be built in the ﬁrst place. With high pressure to
disburse funding and achieve results, such steps may be glossed over in favor of more direct
routes to implement projects. Mansuri and Rao (2013) cautioned that many conditions
need to be met for these programs to increase citizen participation. Without some sort
of aﬃrmative action, disadvantaged groups may be sidelined in the participatory process,
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worsening existing inequalities. Furthermore, unless there are incentives for people to reach
out beyond their existing social circles, bonding social cohesion (networks within groups)
may increase but bridging social capital (networks across groups) may not. To ensure that
participatory activities actually happen, rigorous monitoring and capacity building is needed.
In the case of the INDH, as described above, the civic culture is weak in rural Morocco and
the participatory process may not have been enforced in all communes.
Another problem is that local elites may absorb most of the economic beneﬁts, which can leave
social capital unchanged or even lowered. Critics of CDD, as well as of similar "participatory"
approaches, argue that they are not community-driven or community-based at all. Local
elites or opportunistic development entrepreneurs can hijack resources. As a result, funds
never reach their intended recipients (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). The extent of elite
capture may depend on the tradition of local leadership. Based on anecdotal evidence from
Sub-Saharan Africa, Platteau and Abraham (2002) argued that rural African communities
are often led by strong dictatorial leaders. Such leaders often dominate the participation
process in a manner that directly beneﬁts them, in particular when the ﬂow of information
is poor. A qualitative evaluation by IFAD of ﬁve CDD programs in Africa showed that some
programs have managed to build a pluralistic governance setting and enhance partnerships
within the community. However, this depends on the institutional setting and the political
leadership (Pantanali, 2005).
One way to check the extent to which the CDD process was subject to elite capture is
to examine whether the implemented projects were more aligned with the priorities of local
elites or of the people, because if the deliberate decisionmaking process actually took place,
project selection should reﬂect the community preferences. The development priorities of the
people, based on diﬀerent sources, are summarized in Table 4. There does not seem to be
much diﬀerence between CDD and non-CDD communes. The order of priorities may diﬀer
depending on the respondents and the time of the survey but people generally identiﬁed
their needs to be in transport, water and sanitation, eduction, health, and income generation
(e.g. building of market places, youth employment, etc.). Transport, water and sanitation,
and education were also the three domains that received large shares of INDH funding in
the CDD component (22%, 25%, and 9%, respectively). Nevertheless, health and income
generation activities received much less funding (5% and 3%, respectively), while much of
the funding went to agricultural, social, and cultural infrastructure, despite their low priority
in community needs. The distribution of project spending and INDH funding across all
sectors is displayed in Table 5. This shows that there is some, but not full, representation
of people's preferences in project choices. In the future, we plan to investigate the priorities
of the local leaders and this will shed more light on the importance of the elites' preferences
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versus those of the people.
Another explanation for the mixed results may relate to the heterogeneity of treatment across
communes. Thus far, our analysis has focused on the estimation of a binary treatment eﬀect,
but not all implemented projects were equal in size or type. According to the administrative
data of the INDH, on average, a CDD commune spent 12.6 million MAD ($1.5 million) on
projects in the CDD (or rural) component and 3.1 million MAD on projects in the other
two components (Table 6). Of these, the amounts of funding from the INDH program for
each commune were 8.5 and 2.7 million MAD, respectively; and the rest came from other
sources such as local government agencies, NGOs, or the communes themselves. Communes
ineligible for the rural or CDD component spent on average 6.8 million MAD under the other
two components, of which the INDH funding was 4.1 million MAD. Treated communes had
more projects than control communes (43 compared with 13) and most of them were funded
in the rural component. Conversely, project length is similar, with an average of 6 months. It
should be noted that treated communes tended to spend less and receive less INDH funding
in the other components.
To test if these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant, we run an RDD using total project spending
and INDH funding by commune as dependent variables (Table 7). In our sample, there
is evidence that communes eligible for the CDD component spent signiﬁcantly less on the
other components, but the diﬀerence in terms of the money received from the INDH is
not signiﬁcant (columns 1 and 3). We also do the same analysis on the full population of
communes that participated in the INDH (columns 2 and 4). At the optimal bandwidth,
we again detect signiﬁcant (and negative) diﬀerences in terms of project spending and the
amount of funds coming from the INDH. As would be expected, diﬀerences are more precisely
estimated in this larger sample but they are smaller in magnitude as we take into account
communes far away from the cut-oﬀ. To sum up, at least in our sample, treated communes
received similar amounts of INDH funding for the other components but substantially shifted
activities (and money) to the CDD component.
The treatment intensity (in terms of total project spending and INDH funding) for the CDD
component also does not seem to be correlated with exogeneous commune characteristics
(Table 8). However, the total spending and INDH funding for the other two components
appear to be signiﬁcantly correlated with the poverty rate and population size. This means
that communes with lower poverty rates (possibly non-CDD communes) as well as more
populous communes tended to spend more and receive more INDH funding in the other
components.
In a ﬁnal step, we combine the administrative data on treatment intensity with our exper-
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imental data. We can then investigate how this treatment intensity correlates with social
capital in Table 9. In order to focus on treatment intensity rather than the treatment per
se, we split the sample into treated and untreated communes. We ﬁnd that spending on the
CDD (rural) component is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the likelihood of con-
tributing to public goods. For each additional million MAD spent the likelihood goes up by
2.2 percentage points. The correlation is also signiﬁcant with trustworthiness and altruism,
and in the same direction as our RDD results on the binary treatment. Conversely, spending
on the other components is uncorrelated with public goods contribution, trust, and altruism,
both in treated and untreated communes. This underlines our results in demonstrating that
social capital does not respond to non-CDD activities. The only exception is that trustwor-
thiness is positively and signiﬁcantly linked with spending in the other components in treated
communes and negatively correlated in untreated communes. Although not reported here,
we also divide the total spending into parts funded by the INDH program and parts funded
by other sources and correlate them with the experimental behaviors. No systematic corre-
lations appear. This suggests that the total amount of spending, not the source of funding,
matters in the CDD component.
7 Conclusion
This paper estimates how local economic development and community participation aﬀect
social capital in the context of a rural CDD program in Morocco. The identiﬁcation strategy
based on a regression discontinuity design allows for isolation of the causal eﬀect of the
program. Our results indicate that the CDD program has improved public participation, in
particular people's willingness to contribute to public goods in their communities, but from
an already high sense of community responsibility. Further, there is a small and negative
impact on trust that indirectly lowers trustworthiness. There are several hypotheses to
explain this. One is that trust is low in rural Morocco to begin with, particularly when
money is involved. Another possibility is that economic development makes people more
cautious and critical, especially with their earnings. Finally, as households improve their
welfare, they may become more independent, hence have to rely less on others. There is no
signiﬁcant impact on altruism, perhaps because this is a more inherent value that does not
change in the short run. This research has also documented relatively high levels of patience
and risk aversion in rural Morocco. These deeper preferences have remained unaﬀected by
the social and economic development induced by the program. Social capital consists of
fundamental personal and social values that take time to change. Our survey took place
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only two years after the completion of the program so it may not yet capture the long-term
change in these social behaviors.
Our results signal that the CDD approach may help enhance collective action, in line with
the underlying principle of grassroots involvement in decentralized development. This is
signiﬁcant, given the Moroccan context where the centralized approach remains dominant.
Before and in particular after the wake of the Arab Spring, Morocco has gradually moved
towards democratic reforms. These small steps may also explain the presence of positive, yet
weak, impacts. The INDH program, with its demand-driven nature, is a ﬁrst step towards
decentralization in a country used to top-down policies. In the long term, this strengthened
collective action could serve as an important building block for community development, as
people begin to have a higher sense of ownership and responsibility toward the welfare of
their community.
In this paper, we look only at average households. Local elites may respond diﬀerently
to changes in the decisionmaking procedures. Finally, the causal chain between CDD and
social cohesion depends on many channels, and it is important to identify which channel
matters and in what context. Such an understanding would contribute to hypotheses about
the causal mechanisms between CDD and social capital, as well as help ﬁgure out which
aspects of the program should be enhanced in order for it to increase social capital. Further
research is therefore needed to understand the robustness and dynamics underlying these




Table 1: Summary statistics
Overall Treated Untreated P-value
Mean N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD ∆
Game behaviors
Public good 0.67 358 0.69 1.00 - 371 0.65 1.00 - 0.25
Trust 3.93 175 3.91 5.00 2.35 175 3.94 5.00 2.62 0.90
Trustworthiness 7.02 193 7.42 10.00 5.08 195 6.62 5.00 5.16 0.12
Altruism 5.68 368 5.89 6.00 3.50 372 5.47 5.00 3.31 0.10
Risk taking 3.65 368 3.61 3.00 2.36 372 3.68 3.00 2.30 0.69
Patience 0.72 368 0.72 1.00 - 341 0.72 1.00 - 0.90
Participants
Age 53.10 368 51.50 50.50 14.30 371 54.80 54.00 15.70 0.00
Male 0.90 368 0.90 1.00 - 372 0.89 1.00 - 0.66
Literacy 0.35 368 0.36 0.00 - 371 0.35 0.00 - 0.81
Household size 6.63 368 6.58 6.00 3.29 371 6.68 6.00 3.36 0.68
Poverty Map
Poverty rate 29.74 31 30.41 30.34 0.27 30 29.05 29.02 0.62 0.00
Population size 8589.97 31 9197.74 9130.00 4236.46 30 7961.93 7512.00 4130.57 0.25
Poor people 2554.10 31 2797.16 2819.00 1287.01 30 2302.93 2188.50 1174.99 0.12
Road indicator 30.31 31 28.10 31.00 15.56 30 32.60 34.00 13.40 0.23
Schooling (in %) 35.28 31 34.84 35.00 5.54 30 35.73 36.50 4.96 0.51
Note: Patience is coded as the % of people who were willing to wait three days to receive any amount of
money higher than 10 MAD today.
Table 2: The impact of CDD on experimental behaviors: baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public good Trust Trustworthiness Altruism Risk Patience
Sample mean 0.67 3.93 7.02 5.68 3.65 0.72
CDD 0.190 -1.280 -1.830 0.162 -0.687 -0.026
SE (0.079)* (0.551)* (1.100) (0.498) (0.442) (0.078)
Clustered SE (0.078)* (0.410)* (1.140) (0.532) (0.480) (0.047)
Bandwidth 0.780 0.944 0.940 1.146 0.615 0.737
N 466 252 276 595 416 434
Note: Non-parametric RDD at the optimal bandwidth. No controls included. Standard errors clustered on
the forcing variable (i.e. at the commune level). * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Table 3: The impact of CDD on experimental behaviors: commune averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public good Trust Trustworthiness Altruism Risk Patience
Sample mean 0.67 3.93 7.03 5.76 3.61 0.72
CDD 0.141 -1.199+ -1.586 0.163 -0.427 -0.019
SE (0.103) (0.673) (1.524) (0.704) (0.741) (0.079)
Bandwidth 0.918 0.969 1.081 1.385 0.755 0.763
N 42 43 46 49 36 37
Note: Non-parametric RDD at the optimal bandwidth. No controls included. * signiﬁcant at the 5%, +
signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 4: Development areas reported as top-3 priorities (in %)
Individual Household Group Commune
Treated Untreated Treated Untreated Treated Untreated Treated Untreated
Transport 24.1 21.2 10.8 11.5 32.8 31 27 19
Water&sanitation 16.5 15.7 23.4 20.7 17 29
Health 25.5 26.4 11.9 16 31.3 31 2 8
Education 10.6 9.8 9.2 12 12.5 17.2 14 13
Income generation 6.1 8.1 20.1 19.1 19 14
Note: 740 individuals in 61 communes. Individual and group priorities are from the game survey in 2012;
household and commune priorities are from the household and commune surveys in 2011.
Table 5: Total spending and INDH funding by project types (%)
Treated Untreated
CDD component Other components Other components
Spending INDH funding Spending INDH funding Spending INDH funding
Agriculture 14.6 14.1 17.2 16.3 9.2 8.8
Income generation 3.1 3.1 5.0 5.4 7.0 6.7
Electriﬁcation 3.2 2.1 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5
Water&sanitation 25.1 24.6 12.9 9.9 19.1 14.7
Education 8.3 9.1 12.5 15.2 14.5 18.0
Training 2.7 2.8 11.5 6.9 6.0 3.7
Health 5.7 5.7 9.6 12.1 5.9 6.2
Transports 21.0 22.2 8.0 8.0 10.1 10.2
Environment 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.1
Cultural&social 15.4 15.5 20.8 23.6 28.7 34.0
Housing 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4
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Table 6: Project summary statistics
Overall
Treated Untreated Diﬀ.
CDD component Other components Other components Other
Mean Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD P-value
Project spending 11.389 12.633 4.274 3.077 3.785 6.787 6.855 0.01
INDH funding 8.546 10.449 2.375 2.261 2.754 4.132 4.596 0.06
Nr. projects 28.3 35.5 16.4 7.2 6.5 12.7 9.3 0.01
Project length 6.10 5.97 2.77 5.75 2.55 5.61 2.33 0.90
Note: Project spending and INDH funding are in millions of MAD; project length is in months.
Table 7: Impact of CDD on project size and funding in other components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(in mil. MAD) Project spending INDH funding
CDD -4.487 -1.467 -1.904 -1.144
SE (1.915)* (0.833) (1.278) (0.456)*
Clustered SE (2.568) (0.534)* (1.527) (0.291)*
Bandwidth 1.237 14.357 1.145 13.554
N 51 866 49 815
Sample Games All Games All
Note: Non-parametric RDD estimates at optimal bandwidth. No controls included. Standard errors
clustered at the province level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 8: Commune determinants of treatment intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(in mil. MAD) Project spending INDH funding
Component CDD Other CDD Other
Poverty rate -0.715 -1.463* 0.944 -2.397*
(5.663) (0.561) (3.305) (0.823)
Pop. size (in 1000s) 0.305 0.346* 0.138 0.487*
(0.409) (0.124) (0.238) (0.182)
Road indicator -0.037 -0.025 0.030 -0.046
(0.106) (0.036) (0.062) (0.053)
Schooling (in %) -0.029 -0.006 -0.101 0.021
(0.333) (0.111) (0.194) (0.162)
Altitude 0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.004
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Temperature 0.096 -0.035 0.036 -0.078
(0.132) (0.039) (0.077) (0.057)
Rainfall 0.009 -0.002) 0.004 -0.003
(0.016) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
N 31 61 31 61
Note: * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Table 9: Exploring treatment heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public goods Trust Trustworthy Altruism Risk taking Patience
Treated
CDD component 0.022* -0.029 -0.114* 0.108 -0.077 -0.007
(in mil MAD) (0.007) (0.036) (0.035) (0.059) (0.040) (0.006)
Other components -0.005 0.019 0.083 0.089 0.107* 0.017
(in mil MAD) (0.008) (0.033) (0.044) (0.058) (0.046) (0.010)
Poverty rate -0.020 -0.749 -0.986 -0.625 -2.510* 0.024
(0.108) (0.536) (1.087) (0.886) (0.592) (0.093)
N 358 175 193 368 368 368
Untreated
Other components -0.005 0.026 -0.112* 0.034 -0.026 -0.002
(in mil MAD) (0.007) (0.036) (0.036) (0.028) (0.016) (0.005)
Poverty rate 0.057 -0.894* 0.778* 0.328 -0.301 -0.112*
(0.068) (0.287) (0.302) (0.433) (0.246) (0.038)
N 370 174 195 371 371 340
Note: Controls include commune population, road and school indicators, # players, male, age, literacy
(individual and commune means) as well as region dummies. The trustworthiness model also includes the
amount sent. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Figures
Figure 1: Project spending by commune and component
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Figure 2: Visual inspection of the discontinuities
Note: Since there is a lot of heterogeneity across communes for each of the outcomes, it is hard to pick out
any discontinuities. To facilitate this we added local smooths.
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Appendix
Internal validity tests
Figure 3: Test of manipulation around the discontinuity following McCrary (2008)
Note: Kernel density of the poverty rate across all Moroccan communes. With a p-value of 16% we fail to
reject the null hypothesis of no sorting around the 30% eligibility threshold.
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Table 10: Test for discontinuities in exogenous commune characteristics: non-parametric
RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poverty map (2004)
Population size Poor people Schooling (in %) Road indicator
CDD -1829.690 -468.524 -3.296 -0.981
SE (2790.054) (839.573) (4.512) (0.950)
Bandwidth 1.443 1.445 1.293 1.151
N 53 53 52 49
Geographical data
Mean temperature Rainfall (in mm) Altitude Ntl. road (in logs)
CDD -1.388 -329.056 -410.923 0.013
SE (3.679) (244.555) (636.619) (0.226)
Bandwidth 1.025 0.842 1.115 0.861
N 48 42 49 42
Note: Unconditional estimates, no co-variates included. Standard errors are below estimates in brackets.
Table 11: Test for discontinuities in attendance to game sessions and exogenous individual
characteristics: non-parametric RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Show-up Nr. players Sex Head Age Literacy
CDD -0.043 0.167 -0.027 0.011 -9.988 0.152
SE (0.062) (1.406) (0.049) (0.036) (2.546)* (0.063)*
Clustered SE (0.057) - (0.037) (0.062) (1.922)* (0.060)*
Bandwidth 0.904 0.809 0.601 1.484 0.808 1.459
N 683 41 communes 416 650 487 650
Note: Unconditional estimates, no co-variates included. Standard errors (clustered at the commune level)
are below estimates in brackets. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Robustness checks
Table 12: Non-parametric RDD - robustness to inclusion of controls: public goods contri-
bution
Public goods (1) (2) (3)
CDD 0.190 0.236 0.185
SE (0.079)* (0.101)* (0.106)
Clustered SE (0.078)* (0.067)* (0.093)*
Bandwidth 0.780 0.780 0.780
N 466 466 466
Controls No Yes No
Region Dummies No No Yes
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of impact estimates to varying bandwidths
Note: Non-parametric local linear regression model with 95% conﬁdence bands (standard errors in green
and clustered standard errors at the commune level in red).
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Table 13: CDD impact on public goods contribution: OLS and Logit RDD
Public goods (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS
CDD 0.069 0.158 0.088 0.285 0.789
SE (0.065) (0.094) (0.128) (0.167) (0.236)*
Clustered SE (0.082) (0.116) (0.161) (0.196) (0.291)*
Logit
CDD 0.303 0.753 0.341 1.343 3.515
SE (0.290) (0.438) (0.589) (0.770) (1.122)*
Clustered SE (0.361) (0.526) (0.715) (0.858) (1.323)*
Order 1 2 3 4 5
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 14: Placebo cut-oﬀs at the median left and right of the actual cut-oﬀ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Median placebo Left Right Left Right Left Right
Public good
CDD -0.222 -0.131 -0.407 -0.308 0.125 -0.054
SE (0.082)* (0.090) (0.210) (0.103)* (0.112) (0.098)
Clustered SE (0.165) (0.105) (0.123)* (0.088)* (0.140) (0.108)
Trust
CDD -0.810 0.409 -4.350 0.045 0.039 1.510
SE (0.652) (0.683) (2.030)* (1.344) (0.946) (0.914)
Clustered SE (0.555) (0.432) (1.100)* (0.428) (0.343) (0.347)*
Trustworthiness
CDD 0.966 1.758 0.524 0.695 1.002 4.358
SE (1.108) (1.299) (2.585) (2.534) (1.226) (1.659)*
Clustered SE (1.451) (0.807)* (2.325) (0.557) (1.153) (0.294)*
Altruism
CDD -1.403 2.444 -2.016 0.831 -1.101 2.068
SE (0.549)* (0.768)* (1.701) (1.182) (0.777) (0.974)*
Clustered SE (0.301)* (0.654)* (0.687)* (0.631) (0.245)* (0.663)*
Risk taking
CDD 1.240 0.165 0.557 0.214 0.766 0.337
SE (0.363)* (0.532) (0.900) (1.072) (0.493) (0.715)
Clustered SE (0.375)* (0.131) (0.648) (0.368) (0.236)* (0.178)
Patience
CDD 0.153 -0.131 -0.113 -0.115 0.126 -0.061
SE (0.087) (0.094) (0.307) (0.125) (0.122) (0.115)
Clustered SE (0.075)* (0.121) (0.077) (0.114) (0.054)* (0.123)
Controls No No Yes Yes No No
Region dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Figure 5: Placebo regressions: public goods and altruism
Public goods Altruism
Public goods - with co-variates Altruism - with co-variates
Public goods - with region dummies Altruism - with region dummies
Note: Non-parametric local linear regression model with 95% conﬁdence bands (unclustered standard
errors).
34
Table 15: Non-parametric RDD - robustness to inclusion of controls: trust
Trust (1) (2) (3)
CDD -1.280 -0.884 -0.814
SE (0.551)* (0.680) (0.621)
Clustered SE (0.410)* (0.376)* (0.404)*
Bandwidth 0.944 0.944 0.944
N 252 252 252
Controls No Yes No
Region dummies No No Yes
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 16: CDD impact on trust: OLS and Poisson RDD
Trust (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS
CDD -0.235 -1.469 -2.220 -3.536 -3.168
SE (0.492) (0.707)* (0.959)* (1.250)* (1.785)
Clustered SE (0.613) (0.751)* (0.733)* (1.026)* (1.477)*
Poisson
CDD -0.060 -0.345 -0.541 -0.872 -0.803
SE (0.099) (0.139)* (0.196)* (0.264)* (0.370)*
Clustered SE (0.155) (0.182) (0.193)* (0.276)* (0.383)*
Order 1 2 3 4 5
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 17: Non-parametric RDD - robustness to inclusion of controls: trustworthiness
Trustworthiness (1) (2) (3) (4)
CDD -1.830 -1.090 -0.131 0.362
SE (1.100) (1.330) (1.216) (0.682)
Clustered SE (1.140) (1.050) (1.185) (0.644)
Bandwidth 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940
N 276 276 276 276
Controls No Yes No Amount sent
Region dummies No No Yes No
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.
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Table 18: CDD impact on trustworthiness: OLS and Poisson RDD
Trust (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS
CDD 0.318 -2.282 -4.483 -7.850 -7.131
SE (0.964) (1.377) (1.838)* (2.389)* (3.390)*
Clustered SE (1.485) (1.961) (2.045)* (2.638)* (3.802)
Poisson
CDD 0.044 -0.314 -0.606 -1.080 -1.014
SE (0.071) (0.098)* (0.140)* (0.189)* (0.261)*
Clustered SE (0.210) (0.249) (0.290)* (0.402)* (0.549)
Order 1 2 3 4 5
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Figure 6: Placebo regressions: trust and trustworthiness
Trust Trustworthiness
Trust - with co-variates Trustworthiness - with co-variates
Trust - with region dummies Trustworthiness - with region dummies
Note: Non-parametric local linear regression model with 95% conﬁdence bands (unclustered standard
errors).
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Table 19: Non-parametric RDD - robustness to inclusion of controls: altruism
Altruism (1) (2) (3)
CDD 0.162 0.836 0.164
SE (0.498) (0.610) (0.544)
Clustered SE (0.532) (0.626) (0.514)
Bandwidth 1.146 1.146 1.146
N 595 595 595
Controls No Yes No
Region dummies No No Yes
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.
Table 20: CDD impact on altruism: OLS and Poisson RDD
Altruism (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS
CDD 0.628 0.044 0.178 0.353 -1.328
SE (0.464) (0.680) (0.929) (1.208) (1.713)
Clustered SE (0.611) (0.809) (0.994) (1.276) (1.684)
Poisson
CDD 0.112 0.005 0.025 0.071 -0.220
SE (0.057)* (0.083) (0.113) (0.151) (0.213)
Clustered SE (0.108) (0.139) (0.170) (0.230) (0.292)
Order 1 2 3 4 5
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Table 21: Non-parametric RDD - robustness to inclusion of controls: risk taking and patience
(1) (3) (4)
Risk taking
CDD -0.687 -0.157 0.13
SE (0.442) (0.554) (0.593)
Clustered SE (0.48) (0.391) (0.384)
Bandwidth 0.615 0.615 0.615
N 416 416 416
Patience
CDD -0.026 -0.057 0.092
SE (0.078) (0.099) (0.100)
Clustered SE (0.047) (0.046) (0.065)
Bandwidth 0.737 0.737 0.737
N 434 434 434
Controls No Yes No
Region Dummies No No Yes
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.
Table 22: CDD impact on risk taking and patience: OLS and parametric RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk taking OLS
CDD 0.746 -0.438 -1.022 -3.122 -5.811
SE (0.314)* (0.457) (0.621) (0.803)* (1.132)*
Clustered SE (0.582) (0.796) (0.937) (0.905)* (1.065)*
Risk taking Poisson
CDD 0.203 -0.146 -0.289 -0.892 -1.600
SE (0.070)* (0.105) (0.146)* (0.194)* (0.269)*
Clustered SE (0.154) (0.214) (0.265) (0.241)* (0.272)*
Patience OLS
CDD -0.002 0.031 -0.097 -0.181 -0.225
SE (0.062) (0.089) (0.123) (0.160) (0.227)
Clustered SE (0.057) (0.090) (0.113) (0.145) (0.161)
Patience Logit
CDD -0.010 0.186 -0.603 -0.946 -1.365
SE (0.310) (0.490) (0.675) (0.848) (1.293)
Clustered SE (0.289) (0.534) (0.654) (0.769) (0.973)
Order 1 2 3 4 5
Note: Controls include individual and commune characteristics (see descriptive statistics in Table1).
Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Figure 7: Placebo regressions: risk taking and patience
Risk taking Patience
Risk taking - with co-variates Patience - with co-variates
Risk taking - with region dummies Patience - with region dummies
Note: Non-parametric local linear regression model with 95% conﬁdence bands (unclustered standard
errors).
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